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Abstract
Background: In an influenza pandemic, the benefit of vaccines and antiviral medications will be constrained by limitations on
supplies and effectiveness. Non-pharmaceutical public health interventions will therefore be vital in curtailing disease spread.
However, the most comprehensive assessments of the literature to date recognize the generally poor quality of evidence on
which to base non-pharmaceutical pandemic planning decisions. In light of the need to prepare for a possible pandemic despite
concerns about the poor quality of the literature, combining available evidence with expert opinion about the relative merits of
non-pharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza may lead to a more informed and widely accepted set of
recommendations. We evaluated the evidence base for non-pharmaceutical public health interventions. Then, based on the
collective evidence, we identified a set of recommendations for and against interventions that are specific to both the setting in
which an intervention may be used and the pandemic phase, and which can be used by policymakers to prepare for a pandemic
until scientific evidence can definitively respond to planners' needs.
Methods: Building on reviews of past pandemics and recent historical inquiries, we evaluated the relative merits of non-
pharmaceutical interventions by combining available evidence from the literature with qualitative and quantitative expert
opinion. Specifically, we reviewed the recent scientific literature regarding the prevention of human-to-human transmission of
pandemic influenza, convened a meeting of experts from multiple disciplines, and elicited expert recommendation about the use
of non-pharmaceutical public health interventions in a variety of settings (healthcare facilities; community-based institutions;
private households) and pandemic phases (no pandemic; no US pandemic; early localized US pandemic; advanced US pandemic).
Results: The literature contained a dearth of evidence on the efficacy or effectiveness of most non-pharmaceutical interventions
for influenza. In an effort to inform decision-making in the absence of strong scientific evidence, the experts ultimately endorsed
hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette, surveillance and case reporting, and rapid viral diagnosis in all settings and during all
pandemic phases. They also encouraged patient and provider use of masks and other personal protective equipment as well as
voluntary self-isolation of patients during all pandemic phases. Other non-pharmaceutical interventions including mask-use and
other personal protective equipment for the general public, school and workplace closures early in an epidemic, and mandatory
travel restrictions were rejected as likely to be ineffective, infeasible, or unacceptable to the public.
Conclusion: The demand for scientific evidence on non-pharmaceutical public health interventions for influenza is pervasive,
and present policy recommendations must rely heavily on expert judgment. In the absence of a definitive science base, our
assessment of the evidence identified areas for further investigation as well as non-pharmaceutical public health interventions
that experts believe are likely to be beneficial, feasible and widely acceptable in an influenza pandemic.
Published: 15 August 2007
BMC Public Health 2007, 7:208 doi:10.1186/1471-2458-7-208
Received: 4 January 2007
Accepted: 15 August 2007
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/208
© 2007 Aledort et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Page 1 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Public Health 2007, 7:208 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/208Background
Ongoing concerns about the emergence of an influenza
pandemic continue as the number of avian and human
infections with the H5N1 virus mount [1,2]. Adequate
amounts of vaccine or antivirals are unlikely to be availa-
ble early on in a pandemic, and the latter could become
ineffective because of resistance [3]. These factors have
focused attention on the use of non-pharmaceutical pub-
lic health interventions to inhibit human-to-human trans-
mission and fueled interest in answering important
questions about influenza epidemiology and transmis-
sion [4-9]. However, the most comprehensive assess-
ments of the literature to date recognize the generally poor
quality of evidence on which to base pandemic planning
decisions [8-10]. In light of the need to prepare for a pos-
sible pandemic despite concerns about the poor quality of
the literature, combining available evidence with expert
opinion about the relative merits of non-pharmaceutical
interventions for pandemic influenza may lead to a more
informed and widely accepted set of recommendations.
At the request of the US. Department of Health and
Human Services, we evaluated the evidence base for non-
pharmaceutical public health interventions by reviewing
recent published literature, including historical reviews,
convening a meeting of experts, and formally eliciting and
quantifying expert opinion about the relative efficacy and
effectiveness of specific non-pharmaceutical interventions
for pandemic influenza. Based on this collective evidence,
we identified a set of recommendations for and against
interventions that are specific to both the setting in which
an intervention may be used and the pandemic phase,
and which can be used by policymakers to prepare for a
pandemic until scientific evidence can definitively
respond to planners' needs. We also identified important
areas of uncertainty that warrant further research.
Methods
Literature review
We identified scientific articles through a MEDLINE
search that combined communicable and infectious dis-
ease with non-vaccine and non-pharmaceutical interven-
tion search terms. We searched various combinations of
the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) headings in bio-
medical and infections control journals back to 1966 [see
Additional file 1]. We also performed additional searches
for review articles in the following journals from 2000 to
2005: Nature, Journal of the American Medical Association,
New England Journal of Medicine, Annals of Internal Medi-
cine, British Medical Journal, Science, Lancet, Emerging Infec-
tious Diseases, Journal of Infectious Disease, and Clinical
Infectious Disease. Finally, we included additional litera-
ture identified by manual review of references lists of
selected articles. The search identified 2,552 titles, of
which 168 were eventually selected based on general rele-
vance. Exclusion criteria are presented in Table 1. Using a
modified rating scale derived from West et al., we then for-
mally rated the strength of the scientific evidence pre-
sented in each of the relevant articles [11]. Table 2
presents the modified rating scheme and reports the
number of individual articles that fell into each rating cat-
egory. We have presented a list of the final articles selected
for full review and classification [see Additional file 2].
Elicitation of expert knowledge and opinion
While completing the literature review, we convened a
meeting of experts on January 17 and 18, 2006, in Arling-
ton, VA. Attendees represented a broad range of disci-
plines, including biomedical research, virology, clinical
practice, infection control, epidemiology, public health,
ethics, law, history, and health policy. All panelists except-
ing one were based in North America. Participants identi-
fied a set of non-pharmaceutical public health
interventions that could potentially mitigate an influenza
pandemic and grouped them into four categories: (1)
infection control and prevention to reduce transmission
when contact occurs between infected and uninfected
individuals; (2) patient management to reduce contact
between infected and uninfected individuals; (3) contact
management to reduce contact between possibly infected
and uninfected individuals; and (4) voluntary and man-
datory community restrictions to reduce contact between
groups that may contain infected persons (Table 3).
Participants qualitatively evaluated each intervention con-
sidering a broad range of factors, including efficacy
(effects under ideal conditions) and various aspects of
effectiveness (effects under real-world constraints). The
latter included feasibility, cost, logistics, operational and
infrastructure constraints, and acceptability in terms of
concerns surrounding legality and ethics, equity, public
confidence, and potential unintended consequences. In
their deliberations, the experts also considered the differ-
ent settings in which these interventions might be applied
(healthcare facilities, community-based institutions, and
private households). They also considered the epidemic
phases in which the use of these interventions should be
evaluated (no pandemic, no US pandemic, early localized
US pandemic, and advanced US pandemic).
Table 1: Results of literature search
Titles identified 2,556
Remaining after exclusion of case reports and articles 
pertaining to vaccines, antiviral medications other 
medical countermeasures
506
Remaining after title and abstract review 319
Remaining after screen for relevance 168Page 2 of 9
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unique intervention-setting-phase triads identified during
the meeting based on the totality of their knowledge. Thir-
teen of seventeen responded. Ratings were on a scale of 1
to 5, with 1 being 'not recommended' and 5 being
'strongly recommended'. We scored the ratings using an
adaptation of the RAND/UCLA Appropriateness Method
[12,13]. We first discarded the two extreme high and low
ratings for each item. We then defined agreement as all
ratings falling within a single 2-point range and all other
outcomes as disagreement. Among those items for which
there was agreement, items with ratings of 4 or 5 were clas-
sified as a recommendation for use, and items with ratings
of 1 or 2 were classified as a recommendation against use
[12].
Results
Our formal ratings of the articles revealed few high quality
studies to inform the evidence base for non-pharmaceuti-
cal interventions for influenza. The majority of topically
relevant articles we identified were narrative reviews, case
reports, observational studies or expert opinion, editorials
and commentaries (Table 2). We found only 9 systematic
reviews of relevant material and 3 randomized clinical tri-
als. Additionally, few of the topically relevant articles were
directly on-point.
In light of the evident lack of scientific evidence about spe-
cific non-pharmaceutical interventions in the context of
seasonal or pandemic influenza, there was limited directly
useable information from the majority of the studies iden-
tified in the formal Medline search. For this reason, we
turned to expert opinion to inform and categorize the
findings [14]. Expert panels are often used to develop
guidelines and recommendations when compelling evi-
dence is lacking. Drawing on both qualitative discussion
at the expert panel and quantitative results from the fol-
low-up survey discussed above, we classified the non-
pharmaceutical interventions into two broad categories,
those whose use was recommended by the panel and
Table 3: Non-pharmaceutical public health interventions
Human surveillance
Case reporting




Surgical and N95 Masks
Other personal protective equipment*
Patient Management
Isolation of sick individuals








Cancellation of group events
International and domestic travel restrictions
* Gowns, gloves and protective eye covers
† Separating exposed individuals from others
‡ Voluntary sequestration of healthy persons to avoid exposure
§Exit and entry screening, travel advisories
Table 2: Modified rating scheme and results for N = 168 articles
Classification Definition Grade Results
Systematic Review Documented extensive literature search; quantitative or 
qualitative summary
A 9
Narrative Review Summary of field or problem by an expert citing references 
obtained in a non-systematic manner
B 49
RCT Prospectively randomized at individual or group level C 3
Observational Studies Formal design, almost always a control group whether 
prospective or retrospective, and whether cross-section, panel, 
or case-control. Includes analysis of large dataset analysis.
D 29
Mathematical Models Uses mathematical language to describe and predict biomedical 
and epidemiologic outcomes.
E 12
Case Reports or Series Report of a (hopefully pertinent) case or series of cases, often 
with a perspective on the current state of affairs or the current 
literature
F 30
Diagnostic Test Studies Studies of the laboratory or filed performance of a diagnostic 
test. Generally compare sensitivity and specificity to some gold 
standard
G 0
Evidence Based guidelines Guidelines developed by bodies after review of the literature H 9
Expert Opinion, Editorials & 
Commentaries
Opinion or "newsy" narratives I 27
TOTAL 168Page 3 of 9
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ure 1) summarizes the results from the survey question-
naire, providing the complete list of non-pharmaceutical
intervention-setting-phase combinations that were que-
ried and the number and proportion of items for which
there was agreement (41.5%) or disagreement (58.5%).
We included relevant findings from the literature, where
available, in our discussion of the specific interventions,
and we cited some of the selected studies from the formal
Medline search, as well as others that supplemented the
search, to provide necessary background information
when appropriate and to support some commonly held
views about infection control activities. We also note
below interventions about which there was disagreement
or no recommendation by the panel.
Interventions recommended for use
Hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette
Hospital-based infection control measures such as hand
hygiene and respiratory etiquette to prevent the spread of
infection are widely supported in the literature and
broadly accepted [15-20]. Many controlled studies have
shown a protective effect of hand hygiene in reducing
upper respiratory infections, although few of the infec-
tions studied were due to influenza [9,21-27]. Some stud-
ies suggest that use of an alcohol-based hand sanitizer is
more effective in preventing carriage of non-spore form-
ing bacteria and direct spread of most infections than anti-
microbial soap or no hand washing, but antimicrobial
handwashing products have not been shown to offer an
advantage over soap and water [9,23,28-34].
The experts recommended rigorous and routine hand
hygiene as an important strategy for healthcare workers
and the general public in all settings and at all phases of a
pandemic, including prior to a pandemic (Table 4 - see
figure 1). However, important barriers to the effective use
of hand hygiene were noted, including adherence, the
supply and cost of commercially available disinfectant
soaps and alcohol-based rubs, and the pervasive practice
of hand-shaking. 
Experts also recommended respiratory etiquette as an
important means of preventing transmission for all
patients and providers in all pandemic phases, and in the
community and/or home when the US pandemic is early
and localized. Respiratory hygiene and cough etiquette is
generally held to include covering the mouth and nose
with a tissue or into the upper sleeve when coughing or
sneezing, and refraining from spitting [35]. However, they
urged that the promotion of respiratory etiquette be cou-
pled with a compelling public education campaign that
includes information regarding the signs and symptoms
of influenza.
Human surveillance and case reporting
We found little direct empirical evidence on the efficacy or
effectiveness of surveillance and case reporting in the con-
text of influenza. Nevertheless, in light of experience with
SARS, the experts recommended both as important to
containing the spread of a pandemic [36]. Influenza sur-
veillance supports a range of necessary preparedness activ-
ities, including: 1) providing information regarding the
presence and epidemiology of influenza viruses in the
community, 2) determining appropriate interventions, 3)
targeting interventions, and 4) generating current accurate
information for public health officials, providers and the
public. While the experts agreed that human surveillance
and case reporting are efficacious and likely to be effective
during any pandemic phase, broad endorsement was
qualified by concerns about resource constraints, espe-
cially in a large outbreak, potential difficulties in cooper-
ation between providers and governmental and non-
governmental entities, the cost of scaling up capacity to
report and investigate influenza-like illness, privacy rights
and the right to informed consent [5].
Rapid viral diagnosis
The key limitation of currently available rapid tests for
influenza is suboptimal sensitivity, especially in adults
[37-40]. New and more sensitive technologies for rapid
diagnosis of influenza that can reliably identify influenza
among patients with respiratory syndromes would greatly
aid in the efficient allocation of limited resources such as
isolation facilities. The experts agreed on the need for
increased investment in the development and deploy-
ment of improved rapid diagnostic tests for influenza,
arguing that such testing will be invaluable for effective
surveillance and in managing all but the most advanced
phases of a US pandemic. Moreover, since viral diagnosis
of influenza is currently not routine practice, the experts
reasoned that education regarding the importance of
improved tests will be necessary to increase the adoption
of such tests in the US health system. If new tests can be
packaged in a way that facilitates use in non-clinical set-
tings, their potential to facilitate disease containment
efforts will be even greater. However, the lack of incentives
for routine use of costly tests could limit development and
production of new technologies, creating shortages in a
pandemic emergency.
Provider and patient use of masks and other personal protective 
equipment
Uncertainty about the mode of influenza transmission
has influenced debate about when and whether to use
masks or N95 respirators for pandemic influenza. Droplet
transmission is thought to be the primary mode of trans-
mission, and provides the basis for CDC guidelines that
health-care personnel wear masks for close patient contact
(i.e., within 3 feet) to control influenza transmission dur-Page 4 of 9
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Survey questionnaire resultsFigure 1
Survey questionnaire results. *Hospital = inpatient acute care hospital, inpatient long-term care facility or any inpatient setting; 
'Ambulatory' = emergency departments, ambulatory hospital care, urgent care centers, providers' offices, clinics or other com-
munity-based healthcare settings and includes care delivered in the community by first responders; 'Community' = schools 
workplaces, churches, malls, stadiums, etc,; 'Home' = care delivered in private residences. †None = overseas cases only; Else-
where = no cases in your state/locality/jurisdiction; Early Localized = cases your state/locality/jurisdiction; Advanced = wide-
spread human-to-human transmission in the US §Since some items were left blank, the indicated results were based on 9, 10, 
11 or 12 responses (of out of a possible 13). All remaining results are based on all 13 responses. Green Circle = Recommenda-
tion for use (46/200 items (23%)) Red Circle = Recommendation against use (37/200 items (18.5%)) Clear Circle = Disagree-
ment (117/200 items (59%) Dash = Not Applicable (respondents were instructed to leave blank)
BMC Public Health 2007, 7:208 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/208ing the influenza season [41]. But experience from sea-
sonal influenza also provides evidence of contact, droplet
and aerosol transmission of influenza that lend support
for N95 respirators, which are designed to stop up to 95%
of small airborne particles [42]. A recent Institute of Med-
icine (IOM) study found that empirical evidence about
the efficacy or effectiveness of inexpensive, disposable
masks and respirators against influenza is limited [43-46].
Our experts recognized this as an area of significant con-
troversy and complexity, but they generally recommended
reserving surgical masks, N95 respirators and other per-
sonal protective equipment for hospital and ambulatory
patients and providers when a community outbreak
begins or when the pandemic was widespread. Moreover,
surgical masks and N95 respirators were recognized as a
non-invasive technology that would induce no antiviral
drug resistance. The experts qualified their recommenda-
tion, noting that poor training, improper use and, for N95
respirators, the need for fit-testing may compromise the
overall effectiveness of these measures.
Isolation of the sick
The amount of influenza virus shed by symptomatic indi-
viduals is greater than in the asymptomatic phase, but
viral shedding typically begins shortly after infection and
before the onset of symptoms. This limits the efficacy of
isolation except for individuals completely quarantined
almost immediately after contact with an infected person
[47]. However, more recent studies report that when num-
bers are small, isolation in hospitals using appropriate
infection control measures may be effective[47]. While
discussions were uniformly supportive of routine infec-
tion control measures, the experts did not agree on recom-
mendations for mandatory isolation in any specific setting.
This was because of the inconclusive nature of the evi-
dence, the concern that healthcare facilities are likely to be
rapidly overwhelmed, and that overflow into difficult to
manage public settings such as arenas would be less effec-
tive. Moreover, mandatory isolation outside of healthcare
settings, even if effective and enforceable, raises a range of
legal, political and ethical issues that can, at a minimum,
erode public acceptance of these policies. Despite the
skepticism about mandatory isolation strategies, voluntary
self-isolation in the home was recommended for all
phases of a US pandemic.
Interventions whose use is not recommended
Masks and other personal protective equipment for the general 
public
With the exception of some evidence from SARS, we did
not find any published data that directly support the use
of masks, respirators, or other personal protective equip-
ment by the public, or other steps such as disinfecting sur-
faces beyond usual practices. The expert's views were
mixed. There was uncertainty regarding requirements for
masks or respirators because of uncertainty about the rel-
ative roles of droplet versus aerosol transmission. Con-
cerns about supply, competency in mask and especially
respirator fitting and use, adherence by the public, and
social impact of mask-wearing all served to undermine the
panel's confidence in the feasibility and acceptability of
widespread use. On the survey, experts recommended
against the use of masks or respirators by the public prior
to the arrival of pandemic influenza and in the early local-
ized phase. For similar reasons, experts recommended
against the public use of other protective equipment such
as gowns, gloves and protective eye wear.
Mandatory social distancing measures
Although social distancing measures such as workplace
closures, limitations on location-based gatherings and
events, and mandated travel restrictions have been a
recent focus of investigation, and some of these measures
were implemented in Asia and North America during
SARS, their effectiveness in an influenza outbreak has not
yet been established [5,8,48]. Despite the propensity of
influenza epidemics to be amplified in primary schools,
data on the effectiveness of school closures for reducing
community transmission are contradictory. Most empiri-
cal studies suggest a decline in community transmission
rates of respiratory infections with school closures[49,50],
but the WHO Writing Group also noted older studies
showing increases in the spread of disease and subsequent
illness after a school holiday, and protective effects when
schools remained open [9]. Recent modeling studies gen-
erally support school closure and confinement in the
home as an effective means of reducing overall attack rates
within communities when coupled with antiviral prophy-
laxis, but predicting the effect of closing schools and
workplaces is difficult, since infectious individuals may be
displaced into other settings[47,51,52]. Models suggest
that cancellation of non-essential public gatherings and
restrictions on long-distance travel might help to decrease
rates of transmission and overall morbidity, but the effec-
tiveness of these interventions has not been quantified.
The experts generally thought that community restrictions
could be considered on a case-by-case basis, for example,
cancellation of an event to which thousands would travel.
However, efforts to forcibly limit public assembly or
movement were seen as legally and ethically problematic,
especially when there is limited scientific evidence sup-
porting such restrictions. There are also important practi-
cal and logistical limitations to mandatory long-term
community restrictions and compulsory quarantine, in
addition to the problem of likely public opposition to
such measures [5,53,54]. The experts recommended
against these restrictions when outbreaks were elsewhere,
and they did not agree otherwise. The same is true for
school closures.Page 6 of 9
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widespread and sustained screening of travelers would
ultimately be impractical and inefficient as long as detect-
ing asymptomatic shedding is not feasible. Difficulties
with the rapid diagnosis of influenza means that travel
bans and screening programs risk detaining a large
number of symptomatic persons who do not have influ-
enza. There is also the possibility of such measures leading
to an international backlash, decreasing cooperation at a
time when increased is needed. However, voluntary meas-
ures and guidelines would likely be more acceptable and
thus more effective. The experts recommended against
any mandatory travel restrictions in the advanced phases
of a pandemic and did not recommend restrictions on
domestic or international departures or entry screening
when a pandemic is in the early localized phase.
Discussion
We evaluated the evidence-base for non-pharmaceutical
public health interventions in an influenza pandemic by
reviewing the recent scientific literature, convening a
multidisciplinary meeting of experts, and eliciting expert
knowledge qualitatively and quantitatively. Despite the
poor quality of the evidence, the use of expert opinion has
enabled us to identify strategies that are likely to help slow
influenza transmission in a pandemic setting and also do
no harm. Our findings highlight the importance of speci-
fying the setting in which a non-pharmaceutical public
health intervention will be used, as well as when its use
should be considered. Although the interplay of these fac-
tors and deep uncertainty about the relative efficacy or
effectiveness of specific non-pharmaceutical public health
interventions prevents us from conclusively pinpointing
an optimal set of non-pharmaceutical public health inter-
ventions for every circumstance, our study provides some
important insights about pandemic planning.
Consistent with others, we found that the published liter-
ature revealed scant confirmatory evidence on efficacy and
overall effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical public health
interventions in an influenza pandemic, effectively forc-
ing policymakers to turn to expert opinion[8,9]. Some
infection control studies classified as systematic reviews,
observational studies or evidence-based guidelines consti-
tuted stronger evidence, at least for spread of respiratory
disease[14]. The remaining scientific evidence is of low
strength (further research is very likely to change estimates
of effect) or very low strength (effects are quite uncertain),
specifically with respect to seasonal and pandemic influ-
enza [14]. The published literature consisted mainly of
narrative reviews of past pandemics, contemporary obser-
vations, editorials, commentaries and case reports or
series.  It also included articles drawing inferences from
biology and pathophysiology, clinical epidemiology and
mathematical modeling studies, rather than from rand-
omized controlled trials evaluating interventions.
First, policymakers should actively promote personal
responsibility for slowing spread of infection through
good hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette in all settings
and at all times. Use of disinfectant hand soaps and alco-
hol-based rubs should also be encouraged. Second, devel-
oping the capability and capacity for early rapid viral
diagnosis should be a high priority. Third, healthcare pro-
viders need to be better trained to maximize the effective-
ness of infection control measures, including use of
masks, respirators, and other personal protective equip-
ment. It may be reasonable to recommend limited use of
personal protective measures in certain other settings such
as mask-wearing by the ill or perhaps surface disinfection
of very heavily trafficked public areas. However, other use
of personal protective equipment by the general public is
not recommended at this time. Fourth, and also consist-
ent with other studies, we founds that widespread govern-
ment mandates to segregate individuals, including
isolation, quarantine, sheltering, location-based commu-
nity restrictions, and travel restrictions, are less likely than
voluntary measures to be recommended, especially over
the longer-term[55]. Instead, less invasive voluntary
efforts to reduce social contact, especially self-isolation of
the sick at home, self-quarantine of the exposed, and,
when feasible, sheltering by the well ought to be widely
supported. This will require education, persuasion, and
social support to ensure that medical and non-medical
needs are met, with the latter being central to the success
of sequestration measures in all settings. Fifth, informa-
tion needs are pervasive. Very little of the literature is on
point, and the experts disagreed 60 percent of the time.
Well-controlled observational and especially interven-
tional studies are needed, especially in the context of sea-
sonal influenza.
Conclusion
The demand for scientific evidence on non-pharmaceuti-
cal public health interventions for influenza is pervasive,
and policy recommendations must rely heavily on expert
judgment. In the absence of a definitive science base, our
assessment of the evidence identified areas for further
investigation as well as non-pharmaceutical public health
interventions that experts believe are likely to be benefi-
cial, feasible, and socially and politically acceptable in an
influenza pandemic. Taken together, the literature and
expert opinion reveal the kinds of explicit judgments
required to translate existing knowledge into policy-rele-
vant terms. These findings should be considered in form-
ing national, state, local, and facility pandemic plans.Page 7 of 9
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